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Abstract
The existence of simple, uncoupled no-regret dynamics that converge to correlated
equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent
systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years that when all
players seek to minimize their internal regret in a repeated normal-form game,
the empirical frequency of play converges to a normal-form correlated equilib-
rium. Extensive-form (that is, tree-form) games generalize normal-form games by
modeling both sequential and simultaneous moves, as well as private information.
Because of the sequential nature and presence of partial information in the game,
extensive-form correlation has significantly different properties than the normal-
form counterpart, many of which are still open research directions. Extensive-form
correlated equilibrium (EFCE) has been proposed as the natural extensive-form
counterpart to normal-form correlated equilibrium. However, it was currently
unknown whether EFCE emerges as the result of uncoupled agent dynamics. In
this paper, we give the first uncoupled no-regret dynamics that converge to the set
of EFCEs in n-player general-sum extensive-form games with perfect recall. First,
we introduce a notion of trigger regret in extensive-form games, which extends that
of internal regret in normal-form games. When each player has low trigger regret,
the empirical frequency of play is close to an EFCE. Then, we give an efficient
no-trigger-regret algorithm. Our algorithm decomposes trigger regret into local
subproblems at each decision point for the player, and constructs a global strategy
of the player from the local solutions at each decision point.
1 Introduction
The Nash equilibrium (NE) [23] is the most common notion of rationality in game theory, and its
computation in two-player, zero-sum games has been the flagship computational challenge in the
area at the interplay between computer science and game theory (see, e.g., the landmark results in
heads-up no-limit poker by Brown and Sandholm [3] and Moravcˇík et al. [21]). The assumption
underpinning NE is that the interaction among players is fully decentralized. Therefore, an NE is a
distribution on the uncorrelated strategy space (i.e., a product of independent distributions, one per
player). A competing notion of rationality is the correlated equilibrium (CE) proposed by Aumann
[1]. A correlated strategy is a general distribution over joint action profiles and it is customarily
modeled via a trusted external mediator that draws an action profile from this distribution, and
privately recommends to each player her component. A correlated strategy is a CE if no player has
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an incentive to choose an action different from the mediator’s recommendation, because, assuming
that all other players also obey, the suggested strategy is the best in expectation.
Many real-world strategic interactions involve more than two players with arbitrary (i.e., general-sum)
utilities. In these settings, the notion of NE presents some weaknesses which render the CE a natural
solution concept: (i) computing an NE is an intractable problem, being PPAD-complete even in
two-player games [6, 7]; (ii) the NE is prone to equilibrium selection issues; and (iii) the social
welfare than can be attained via an NE may be significantly lower than what can be achieved via
a CE [19, 26]. Moreover, in normal-form games, the notion of CE arises from simple learning
dynamics in senses that NE does not [16, 5].
The notion of extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) by von Stengel and Forges [30] is a
natural extension of the CE to the case of sequential strategic interactions. In an EFCE, the mediator
draws, before the beginning of the sequential interaction, a recommended action for each of the
possible decision points (i.e., information sets) that players may encounter in the game, but she
does not immediately reveal recommendations to each player. Instead, the mediator incrementally
reveals relevant individual moves as players reach new information sets. At any decision point, the
acting player is free to defect from the recommended action, but doing so comes at the cost of future
recommendations, which are no longer issued if the player deviates.
Original contributions We focus on general-sum extensive-form games with an arbitrary number
of players (including the chance player). In this setting, the problem of computing a feasible EFCE
can be solved in polynomial time in the size of the game tree [17] via a variation of the Ellipsoid
Against Hope algorithm [24, 18]. However, in practice, this approach cannot scale beyond toy
problems. Therefore, the following question remains open: is it possible to devise simple dynamics
leading to a feasible EFCE? In this paper, we show that the answer is positive. To do so, we define
an EFCE via the notion of trigger agent [15, 8]. Then, we define the notion of trigger regret, i.e.,
a notion of internal regret suitable for extensive-form games. We provide an algorithm, which we
call ICFR, that minimizes trigger agent regrets via the decomposition of these regrets locally at
each information set. In order to do so, ICFR instantiates an internal regret minimizer and multiple
external regret minimizers for each information set. We show that it is possible to orchestrate the
learning procedure so that, for each information set, employing one regret minimizer per round does
not compromise the overall convergence of the algorithm. The empirical frequency of play generated
by ICFR converges to an EFCE almost surely in the limit. These results generalize the seminal work
by Hart and Mas-Colell [16] to the sequential case via a simple and natural framework.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we provide some groundings on sequential games and regret minimization (see the
books by Shoham and Leyton-Brown [27] and Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [5], for additional details).
2.1 Extensive-form games
We focus on extensive-form games (EFGs) with imperfect information. We denote the set of players
as P ∪ {c}, where c is a chance player that selects actions according to fixed known probability
distributions, representing exogenous stochasticity. An EFG is usually defined by means of a game
tree, where H is the set of nodes of the tree, and a node h ∈ H is identified by the ordered sequence
of actions from the root to the node. Z ⊆ H is the set of terminal nodes, which are the leaves of the
tree. For every h ∈ H \ Z, we let P (h) ∈ P ∪ {c} be the unique player who acts at h and A(h) be
the set of actions she has available. For each player i ∈ P , we let ui : Z → R be her payoff function.
Moreover, we denote by pc : Z → (0, 1) the function assigning each terminal node z ∈ Z to the
product of probabilities of chance moves encountered on the path from the root of the game tree to z.
Imperfect information is encoded by using information sets (infosets). Given i ∈ P , a player i’s
infoset I groups nodes belonging to player i that are indistinguishable for her, i.e., A(h) = A(k)
for any pair of nodes h, k ∈ I . Ii denotes the set of all player i’s infosets. Moreover, we let
A(I) be the set of actions available at infoset I ∈ Ii. As customary, we assume that the game has
perfect recall, i.e., the infosets are such that no player forgets information once acquired. In EFGs
with perfect recall, the infosets Ii of each player i ∈ P are partially ordered. We write I  J
whenever infoset I ∈ Ii precedes J ∈ Ii according to such ordering, i.e., formally, there exists a
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path in the game tree connecting a node h ∈ I to some node k ∈ J . For the ease of notation, given
I ∈ Ii, we let C?(I) be the set of player i’s infosets that follow infoset I (this included), defined as
C?(I) := {J ∈ Ii | I  J}. Moreover, given I ∈ Ii and a ∈ A(I), we let C(I, a) ⊆ Ii be the set of
player i’s infosets that immediately follow I by playing action a, i.e., those reachable from at least
one node h ∈ I by following a path that includes a and does not pass through another infoset of i.
Normal-form plans and strategies A normal-form plan for player i ∈ P is a tuple pii ∈ Πi :=×I∈Ii A(I) which specifies an action for each player i’s infoset, where pii(I) represents the action
selected by pii at infoset I ∈ Ii. We denote with pi ∈ Π :=×i∈P Πi a joint normal-form plan,
defining a plan pii ∈ Πi for each player i ∈ P . Moreover, a tuple defining normal-form plans for
the opponents of player i ∈ P is denoted as pi−i ∈ Π−i :=×j 6=i∈P Πj A normal-form strategy
µi ∈ ∆Πi is a probability distribution over Πi, where µi[pii] denotes the probability of selecting a
plan pii ∈ Πi according to µi. Moreover, µ ∈ ∆Π is a joint probability distribution defined over Π,
with µ[pi] being the probability that the players end up playing the plans prescribed by pi ∈ Π.
Sequences For any player i ∈ P , given an infoset I ∈ Ii and an action a ∈ A(I), we denote
with σ = (I, a) the sequence of player i’s actions reaching infoset I and terminating with a.
Notice that, in EFGs with perfect recall, such sequence is uniquely determined, as paths that reach
nodes belonging to the same infoset identify the same sequence of player i’s actions. We let
Σi := {(I, a) | I ∈ Ii, a ∈ A(I)} ∪ {∅i} be the set of player i’s sequences, where ∅i is the empty
sequence of player i (representing the case in which she never plays). Additionally, given an infoset
I ∈ Ii, we let σ(I) ∈ Σi be the sequence of player i’s actions that identify infoset I .
Subsets of (joint) normal-form plans We now define a few useful subsets of Πi. The reader is
encouraged to refer to Figure 1 for a simple example. For every player i ∈ P and infoset I ∈ Ii,
we let Πi(I) ⊆ Πi be the set of player i’s normal-form plans that prescribe to play so as to reach
infoset I whenever possible (depending on the opponents’ actions up to that point) and any action
whenever reaching I is not possible anymore. Moreover, for every sequence σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi, we let
Πi(σ) ⊆ Πi(I) ⊆ Πi be the set of player i’s plans that reach infoset I and recommend action a at I .
Similarly, given a terminal node z ∈ Z, we denote with Πi(z) ⊆ Πi the set of normal-form plans by
which player i plays so as to reach z, while Π(z) :=×i∈P Πi(z) and Π−i(z) :=×j 6=i∈P Πj(z).
z
a b
c d e f g h g h
A
B C D
A B C D
pi1 a c e g
pi2 a c e h
pi3 a c f g
pi4 a c f h
pi5 a d e g
pi6 a d e h
pi7 a d f g
pi8 a d f h
A B C D
pi9 b c e g
pi10 b c e h
pi11 b c f g
pi12 b c f h
pi13 b d e g
pi14 b d e h
pi15 b d f g
pi16 b d f h
Π1(A) = {pi1, . . . , pi16}
Π1(B) = {pi1, . . . , pi8}
Π1(C) = {pi1, . . . , pi8}
Π1(D) = {pi9, . . . , pi16}
Π1((C, f)) = {pi3, pi4, pi7, pi8}
Π1((D, g)) = {pi9, pi11, pi13, pi15}
Π1(z) = {pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4}
Figure 1: (Left) Sample game tree. Black round nodes belong to Player 1, white round nodes belong to Player 2,
and white square nodes are leaves. Rounded, gray lines denote information sets. (Center) Set Π1 of normal-form
plans for Player 1. Each plan identifies an action at each information set. (Right) Examples of certain subsets of
Π1 defined in this subsection.
Additional notation For every i ∈ P and I ∈ Ii, we let Z(I) ⊆ Z be the set of terminal nodes that
are reachable from infoset I ∈ Ii of player i. Moreover, Z(I, a) ⊆ Z(I) ⊆ Z is the set of terminal
nodes reachable by playing action a ∈ A(I) at infoset I , whereas Zc(I, a) := Z(I) \ Z(I, a) is the
set of the terminal nodes which are reachable by playing an action different from a at I . For any
player i ∈ P , normal-form plan pii ∈ Πi, infoset I ∈ Ii, and terminal node z ∈ Z, we define ρpiiI→z
as a function equal to 1 if z is reachable from I when player i plays according to pii, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, we define a notion of reach such that, for each normal-form plan pi = (pii, pi−i) ∈ Π, infoset
I ∈ Ii, and terminal node z ∈ Z, we have ρ(pii,pi−i)I→z := ρpiiI→z · 1[pi−i ∈ Π−i(z)].
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2.2 External and internal regret minimization
In the regret minimization framework [31], each player i ∈ P plays repeatedly against the others
by making a series of decisions from a set Xi. A regret minimizer for player i ∈ P is a device that,
at each iteration t = 1, . . . , T , supports two operations: (i) RECOMMEND, which provides the next
decision xt+1i ∈ Xi on the basis of the past history of play and the observed utilities up to iteration t;
and (ii) OBSERVE, which receives a utility function uti : Xi → R that is used to evaluate decision xti.
A regret minimizer is evaluated in terms of its cumulative regret. Two types of regret minimizers are
commonly studied, depending on the adopted notion of regret, either external or internal regret.
External regret An external-regret minimizer REXT for player i ∈ P is a device minimizing the
cumulative external regret of player i up to iteration T , which is defined as:
RTi := max
xˆi∈Xi
{
T∑
t=1
uti(xˆi)
}
−
T∑
t=1
uti(x
t
i). (1)
RTi represents how much player i would have gained by always taking the best decision in hindsight,
given the history of utilities observed up to iteration T .
Internal regret An internal-regret minimizer RINT for player i ∈ P is a device minimizing the
cumulative internal regret of player i up to iteration T , which is defined as:
max
xi,xˆi∈Xi
RTi,(xi,xˆi) := maxxi,xˆi∈Xi
{
T∑
t=1
1[xi = x
t
i]
(
uti(xˆi)− uti(xi)
)}
. (2)
Intuitively, player i has small internal regret if, for each pair of decisions (xi, xˆi), she does not regret
of not having played xˆi each time she selected xi. The notion of internal regret is strictly stronger
than the notion of external regret: any algorithm with small internal regret also has small external
regret, but the converse does not hold (see Stoltz and Lugosi [29] for an example).
Regret minimizers show an interesting connection with games when the decision sets Xi are the sets
of normal-form plans Πi and the observed utilities uti are obtained by playing the game according to
the selected plans piti . Letting pi
t := (piti)i∈P be the joint normal-form plan resulting at each iteration
t = 1, . . . , T , we denote with {pit}Tt=1 the overall sequence of plays made by the players. Then, the
empirical frequency of play µ¯T ∈ ∆Π generated by {pit}Tt=1 is such that for every pi ∈ Π:
µ¯T (pi) :=
|{1 ≤ t ≤ T | pit = pi}|
T
. (3)
If all the players play according to some external-regret minimizers, then µ¯T approaches the set of
(normal-form) coarse correlated equilibria, even in EFGs (see Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [5] and Celli
et al. [4] for further details). Moreover, Foster and Vohra [14] established that the empirical frequency
of play generated by any no-internal-regret algorithm (see Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [5] and Blum
and Mansour [2] for some examples) converges to the set of correlated equilibria in repeated games
with simultaneous moves (i.e., normal-form games).
3 Extensive-form correlated equilibria
The definition of EFCE requires the following notion of trigger agent, which, intuitively, is associated
to each player and each of her sequences of action recommendations.
Definition 1 (Trigger agent for EFCE). Given a player i ∈ P , a sequence σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi , and a
probability distribution µˆi ∈ ∆Πi(I), an (σ, µˆi)-trigger agent for player i is an agent that takes on
the role of player i and commits to following all recommendations unless she reaches I and gets
recommended to play a. If this happens, the player stops committing to the recommendations and
plays according to a plan sampled from µˆi until the game ends.
It follows that joint probability distribution µ ∈ ∆Π is an EFCE if, for every i ∈ P , player i’s
expected utility when following the recommendations is at least as large as the expected utility that
any (σ, µˆi)-trigger agent for player i can achieve (assuming the opponents’ do not deviate).
4
For any µ ∈ ∆Π, sequence σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi, and (σ, µˆi)-trigger agent, we define the probability of
the game ending in a terminal node z ∈ Z(I, a) as:
pσµ,µˆi(z) :=
 ∑
pii∈Πi(σ)
pi−i∈Π−i(z)
µ(pii, pi−i)

 ∑
pˆii∈Πi(z)
µˆi(pˆii)
 pc(z), (4)
which accounts for the fact that the agent follows recommendations until she receives the recommen-
dation of playing a at I , and, thus, she ‘gets triggered’ and plays according to pˆii sampled from µˆi
from I onwards. Moreover, the probability of reaching a terminal node z ∈ Z \Z(I) when following
the recommendations is defined as follows:
qµ(z) :=
 ∑
pi∈Π(z)
µ(pi)
 pc(z). (5)
The definition of EFCE reads as follows (see Appendix A or the work by Farina et al. [11] for details):
Definition 2 (Extensive-form correlated equilibrium). An EFCE of an EFG is a joint probability
distribution µ ∈ ∆Π such that, for every i ∈ P and (σ, µˆi)-trigger agent for player i, with σ =
(I, a) ∈ Σi, it holds: ∑
z∈Z(I,a)
qµ(z)ui(z) ≥
∑
z∈Z(I)
pσµ,µˆi(z)ui(z). (6)
A joint probability distribution µ ∈ ∆Π is said to be an -EFCE when the maximum deviation δ(µ)
under µ is such that:
δ(µ) := max
i∈P
max
σ=(I,a)∈Σi
 maxµˆi∈∆Πi(I)
 ∑
z∈Z(I)
pσµ, µˆi(z)ui(z)
− ∑
z∈Z(σ)
qµ(z)ui(z)
 = . (7)
4 Trigger regret and relationships with EFCE
In this section, we introduce the notion of trigger regret. Intuitively, it measures the regret that each
trigger agent has for not having played the best-in-hindsight strategy. As we will show, when each
trigger agent has low trigger regret, then the empirical frequency of play is close to being an EFCE.
Given a sequence {pit}Tt=1, the vector of immediate utilities uti observed by player i ∈ P after any
iteration t = 1, . . . , T is defined as follows. For every infoset I ∈ Ii and action a ∈ A(I) we have:
uti[I, a] :=
∑
z∈Z(I,a)\⋃J∈C(I,a) Z(J)
1[pit−i ∈ Π−i(z)] pc(z)ui(z),
which represents the utility experienced by player i if the game ends after playing action a at
infoset I , without going through other player i’s infosets and assuming that the other players play
as prescribed by the plans pit−i ∈ Π−i at iteration t. Notice that the summation is over the terminal
nodes immediately reachable from I by playing a and the payoff of each terminal node is multiplied
by the probability of reaching it given chance probabilities.
For i ∈ P , the following recursive formula defines player i’s utility attainable at infoset I ∈ Ii when
a normal-form plan pii ∈ Πi is selected:
V tI (pii) := u
t
i[I, pii(I)] +
∑
J∈C(I,pii(I))
V tJ (pii). (8)
Definition 3 (Trigger regret). For every player i ∈ P and sequence σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi, we let RTσ be
the trigger regret for sequence σ, which we define as follows:
RTσ := max
pˆii∈Πi(I)
{
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]
(
V tI (pˆii)− V tI (piti)
)}
.
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The trigger regret for σ = (I, a) represents the regret experienced by the trigger agent that gets
triggered on sequence σ, i.e., when infoset I is reached and action a is recommended. Notice that RTσ
only accounts for those iterations in which piti ∈ Πi(σ), i.e., intuitively, when the actions prescribed
by the normal-form plan piti trigger the agent associated to sequence σ.
The following theorem shows that minimizing the trigger regrets for each player i ∈ P and sequence
σ ∈ Σi allows to approach the set of EFCEs.
Theorem 1. At all times T , the empirical frequency of play µ¯T (Equation 3) is an -EFCE, where
 := max
i∈P
max
σ∈Σi
RTσ
T
.
Corollary 1. If lim sup
T→∞
max
i∈P
max
σ∈Σi
RTσ
T
≤ 0, then lim sup
T→∞
δ(µ¯T ) ≤ 0, that is, for any  > 0, eventu-
ally the empirical frequency of play µ¯T becomes an -EFCE.
5 Laminar regret decomposition for trigger regret
In order to design an algorithm minimizing trigger regrets, we first develop a new regret decomposition
that extends the laminar regret decomposition framework introduced by Farina et al. [10]. Our
decomposition exploits the structure of the EFG to show that trigger regrets can be minimized by
minimizing other suitably defined regret terms which are local at each infoset.
First, for each player i ∈ P , sequence σ = (J, a) ∈ Σi, and infoset I ∈ C?(J) (i.e., any infoset
following from J , this included), we define the notion of subtree regret as follows:
RTσ,I := max
pˆii∈Πi(I)
{
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]
(
V tI (pˆii)− V tI (piti)
)}
.
Each term RTσ,I represents the regret at infoset I experienced by the trigger agent that gets triggered
on sequence σ = (J, a). Differently from the trigger regret RTσ , which is defined only for the infoset
J of σ, the subtree regrets RTσ,I are defined for all the infosets I ∈ Ii such that J  I .
Remark 1. Given player i ∈ P , it is immediate to see that, if RTσ,I = o(T ) for each σ = (J, a) ∈ Σi
and I ∈ C?(J), then RTσ = o(T ) for every σ ∈ Σi. Therefore, we can safely focus on the problem of
minimizing subtree regrets, as this will automatically guarantee convergence to an EFCE.
Next, we need to introduce, for every player i ∈ P and infoset I ∈ Ii, the following parameterized
utility function defined at each iteration t = 1, . . . , T :
uˆtI : A(I) 3 a 7→ uti[I, a] +
∑
J∈C(I,a)
V tJ (pi
t
i), (9)
which represents the utility that player i gets, at iteration t, by playing action a at I and following
the actions prescribed by piti at the subsequent infosets. Then, for each sequence σ = (J, a
′) ∈ Σi,
infoset I ∈ C?(J), and action a ∈ A(I), the laminar subtree regret of action a is defined as:
RˆTσ,I,a :=
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]
(
uˆtI(a)− uˆtI(piti(I))
)
, (10)
while, for σ = (J, a′) ∈ Σi and I ∈ C?(J), the laminar subtree regret is:
RˆTσ,I := max
a∈A(I)
RˆTσ,I,a. (11)
The following two lemmas show that the subtree regrets can be minimized by minimizing the laminar
subtree regrets at all the infosets of the game.
Lemma 1. The subtree regret for each player i ∈ P , sequence σ = (J, a′) ∈ Σi, and infoset
I ∈ C?(J) can be decomposed as:
RTσ,I = max
a∈A(I)

T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]
(
uˆtI(a)− uˆtI(piti(I))
)
+
∑
I′∈C(I,a)
RTσ,I′
.
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Lemma 2. For every player i ∈ P , sequence σ = (J, a′) ∈ Σi, and infoset I ∈ C?(J), it holds:
RTσ,I ≤ max
pˆii∈Πi(I)
∑
I′∈Ii
1[pˆii ∈ Πi(I ′)] RˆTσ,I′ . (12)
6 Internal counterfactual regret minimization
We propose the internal counterfactual regret minimization algorithm (ICFR) as a way to minimize
the laminar subtree regrets described in the previous section. At each iteration t, ICFR builds a
normal-form plan piti in a top-down fashion by sampling an action locally at each infoset, following a
simple rule: if the current infoset can be reached through piti , then an action is sampled according to
an internal-regret minimizer; otherwise, an external-regret minimizer is employed.
Algorithm 1 ICFR (for Player i)
1: function ICFR(i)
2: Initialize the regret minimizers
3: t← 1
4: while t < T do
5: piti ← SAMPLEINTERNAL
6: Observe uti (i.e., u
t
i[I, a] for each pair (I, a))
7: UPDATEINTERNAL(piti , u
t
i)
8: t← t+ 1
9: function SAMPLEINTERNAL
10: for I ∈ Ii in a top-down order do
11: if piti ∈ Πi(I) then
12: piti(I)←RINTI .RECOMMEND()
13: else
14: σtI ← Σci (I) ∩ {(J, piti(J)) | J  I}
15: piti(I)←REXTσt
I
,I .RECOMMEND()
16: function UPDATEINTERNAL(piti , uti)
17: for I ∈ Ii do
18: RINTI .OBSERVE(1[piti ∈ Πi(σ(I))] · uˆtI)
19: for σ ∈ Σci (I) do
20: REXTσ,I .OBSERVE(1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)] · uˆtI)
In order to minimize the laminar subtree regrets,
ICFR needs to instantiate different regret mini-
mizers for each infoset I ∈ Ii. In particular, for
every infoset I ∈ Ii, the algorithm instantiates an
internal-regret minimizer RINTI employing an ar-
bitrary no-internal-regret algorithm. The internal-
regret minimizerRINTI is responsible for the min-
imization of the laminar subtree regrets RˆTσ,I as-
sociated to trigger sequences σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi for
each a ∈ A(I). Moreover, in order to minimize
all the other subtree laminar regrets, ICFR instanti-
ates an additional external-regret minimizerREXTσ,I
for each sequence σ ∈ Σci (I), which is the set of
sequences that do not allow to reach I and whose
last action is played at an infoset preceding I . That
is, Σci (I) := {(J, a) ∈ Σi | J  I, a /∈ σ(I)}.
Algorithm 1 provides a description of the proce-
dures adopted by ICFR. At iteration t and for each
I ∈ Ii, an action is sampled as follows: if the
(possibly partial) normal-form plan piti sampled up to this point allows I to be reached (i.e., it is still
possible that piti ∈ Πi(I)), then an action is selected according to the internal-regret minimizerRINTI
(Line 12). Otherwise, if I cannot be reached through the (possibly partial) plan piti , then we let σ
t
I be
the unique sequence in Σci (I) whose actions are prescribed by pi
t
i (Line 14). In this case, the player
follows the strategy recommended by the external-regret minimizerREXTσtI ,I (Line 15).
The crucial insight is that for each infoset I ∈ Ii, no matter the action selected at I , all but one of the
regret minimizers will receive a non-zero utility. Consequently, all but one of the regret minimizers
can cumulate regret at time t, and that is the regret whose recommendation we follow. Therefore, it is
possible to show that the empirical frequency of play µ¯T obtained via ICFR converges almost surely
to an EFCE. We start with the following auxiliary result.
Lemma 3. For any I, J ∈ Ii : I  J , if RˆTσ,J = o(T ) for all σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi then RˆTσ(I),J = o(T ).
Then, our main result reads as follows:
Theorem 2. When all the players play according to ICFR, µ¯T converges almost surely to an EFCE.
a b
c d
J
I
Trigger sequence
(I, a) (I, b) (J, c) (J, d)
I RˆTa,I Rˆ
T
b,I × ×
J RˆTa,J Rˆ
T
b,J Rˆ
T
c,J Rˆ
T
d,J
Figure 2: (Left) EFG with two infosets I and J
of player i. (Right) The laminar subtree regrets.
Example We provide a simple example illustrating
the key ideas of ICFR. Figure 2–Left describes an EFG
with two infosets I, J of the same player (player i).
Even in such a simple setting ICFR has to ensure that
six laminar subtree regrets are properly minimized (Fig-
ure 2–Right). To simplify the notation, throughout the
example we write RˆTa,I in place of Rˆ
T
(I,a),J (the remain-
ing regrets are treated analogously). ICFR instantiates
three regret minimizers: RINTI ,RINTJ ,REXTb,J . Suppose to be at the t-th iteration. The sampling proce-
dure starts from infoset I . Being the root of the EFG, I is always reached by player i. Therefore, the
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Pl. Info. Seq.
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G3.3 3 837 934
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Iterations T
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µ¯
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Payoff of Player 2
Payoff of Player 1
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
SW-optimal EFCE/EFCCE/NFCCE
Legend
EFCE
EFCCE
NFCCE
Figure 3: (Left) Dimension of the game instances in terms of number of players and infosets/sequences for
each player. (Center) Convergence of ICFR. (Right) Social welfare attained at different -EFCEs computed
via ICFR (black dots corresponds to different seeds).
action is selected following the recommendation of the internal-regret minimizerRINTI . Intuitively,
this ensures that RˆTa,I and Rˆ
T
b,I are small. Now there are two possibilities:
Case piti(I) = a. The partial plan piti allows J to be reached. Therefore, at J , an action is chosen
according to the strategy recommended by RINTJ . This ensures that RˆTc,J and RˆTd,J are managed
properly. By Equation 11, the choice at t does not impact RˆTb,J since pi
t
i /∈ Πi(b). The regret RˆTa,J is
affected by the choice at J because a ∈ σ(J). The internal-regret minimizer RINTJ guarantees that
RˆTc,J = o(T ) and Rˆ
T
d,J = o(T ). Then, by Lemma 3, we have that Rˆ
T
a,J = o(T ).
Case piti(I) = b. We have that σtJ = (I, b). An action at J is sampled according to REXTb,J , which
ensures that the increase in RˆTb,J is small. The other regret terms are not impacted by the choice at t.
7 Experimental evaluation
We evaluate the convergence of ICFR on the standard benchmark games for the computation of
correlated equilibria. We use parametric instances from four different multi-player games: Kuhn
poker [20], Leduc poker [28], Goofspiel [25], and Battleship [11]. Instances of the Kuhn, Leduc,
and Goofspiel games are parametric in the number of players p and in the number of card ranks r.
To increase the readability, we denote by Kp.r the Kuhn poker instance with p players and r ranks
(the other instances are treated analogously). Our Battleship instance (denoted by BS) has a grid
of size 2× 2 and maximum number of rounds per player equal to 3. A detailed description of the
games is provided in Appendix C.1. We use Regret matching [16] for external-regret minimizers,
and the no-internal-regret algorithm by Blum and Mansour [2] for internal-regret minimizers. All
experiments are run on a 64-core machine with 512 GB of RAM.
Convergence of ICFR Figure 3 (Center) displays the maximum deviation δ(µ¯T ) as a function
of the number of rounds T . According to Equation (7), the strategy µ¯T is guaranteed to be a
δ(µ¯T )-EFCE. We set a maximum number of 104 iterations and, for each instance, we provide
the average and the standard deviation computed over 50 different seeds. First, we notice that
ICFR attains roughly an empirical convergence rate of O(1/T ). The performance over the Battleship
instance suggests that equilibria with large support size are significantly more challenging to be
computed. Second, we remark that, unlike recent algorithms for computing EFCEs by Farina et al.
[11, 12], ICFR can be applied to games with more than two players including chance. Moreover,
since EFCE ⊆ EFCCE ⊆ NFCCE, ICFR also provides a flexible way to compute -EFCCEs and
-NFCCEs. In the former case, the only known algorithm can only handle games with two players
and no chance [13]. In the latter case, the recent algorithms by Celli et al. [4] are significantly
outperformed. For example, previous algorithms cannot reach a 0.1-NFCCE in less than 24h on a
Leduc instance with 1200 total infosets and a one-bet maximum per bidding round. ICFR reaches
 = 0.1 in around 9h on an arguably more complex Leduc instance (i.e., more than 9k total infosets
and a two-bet maximum per round). Further details on the computation of EFCCEs and NFCCEs are
provided in Appendix C.2, together with the plots of the decoupled EFCE deviations of each player.
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Social Welfare Figure 3 (Right) provides a visual depiction of the quality of the solutions attained
by ICFR in terms of their social welfare. 1 The figure displays the payoffs obtained for 100 different
seeds in a two-player Goofspiel instance without chance (i.e., the prize deck is sorted).
Broader impact statement Correlated equilibria provide an appropriate solution concept for
coordination problems in which agents have arbitrary utilities, and may work towards different
objectives. The study of uncoupled dynamics converging to correlated equilibria in problems
with sequential actions and hidden information lays new theoretical foundations for multi-agent
reinforcement learning problems. Most of the work in the multi-agent reinforcement learning
community either studies fully competitive settings, where agents play selfishly to reach a Nash
equilibrium, or fully cooperative scenarios in which agents have the exact same goals. Our work
could enable techniques that are in-between these two extremes: agents have arbitrary objectives, but
coordinate their actions towards an equilibrium with some desired properties.
As we argued in the paper, the social welfare that can be attained via a Nash equilibrium (that is, by
playing selfishly) may be significantly lower than what can be achieved via a correlated equilibrium.
We provided some empirical evidences that ICFR computes equilibria which attain a SW ‘not too
far’ from the optimal one. This could have an arguably positive societal impact when applied to real
economic problems. However, further research in this direction is required to prevent ‘winner-takes-
all’ scenarios in problems with an unbalanced reward structure where equilibria with high social
welfare may just award players with the largest utilities at the expense of the others. This could
provide a way to reach fair equilibria both in theory and in practice.
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A Extensive-form correlated equilibrium
In the context of EFGs, the two most widely adopted notions of correlated equilibrium are the normal-form
correlated equilibrium (NFCE) [1] and the extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) [30]. In the former,
the mediator draws and recommends a complete normal-form plan to each player before the game starts. Then,
each player decides whether to follow the recommended plan or deviate to an arbitrary strategy she desires. In an
EFCE, the mediator draws a normal-form plan for each player before the beginning of the game, but she does not
immediately reveal it to each player. Instead, the mediator incrementally reveals individual moves as players reach
new infosets. At any infoset, the acting player is free to deviate from the recommended action, but doing so comes
at the cost of future recommendations, which are no longer issued if the player deviates.
In an EFCE, players know less about the normal-form plans that were sampled by the mediator than in an NFCE,
where the whole normal-form plan is immediately revealed. Therefore, by exploiting an EFCE, the mediator can
more easily incentivize players to follow strategies that may hurt them, as long as players are indifferent as to
whether or not to follow the recommendations. This is beneficial when the mediator wants to maximize, e.g., the
social-welfare of the game.
A coarse correlated equilibrium enforces protection against deviations which are independent of the recommended
move. Normal-form coarse correlated equilibria (NFCCEs) [22] and extensive-form coarse correlated equilibria
(EFCCEs) [13] are the coarse equivalent of NFCE and EFCE, respectively. For arbitrary EFGs with perfect recall,
the following inclusion of the set of equilibria holds: NFCE ⊆ EFCE ⊆ EFCCE ⊆ NFCCE [30, 13].
Appendix A.1 provides a suitable formal definition of the set of EFCEs via the notion of trigger agent (originally
introduced by Gordon et al. [15] and Dudík and Gordon [8]). Finally, Appendix A.2 summarizes existing approaches
for computing EFCEs.
A.1 Formal definition of the set of EFCEs
The definition requires the following notion of trigger agent, which, intuitively, is associated to each player and
each of her sequences of action recommendations.
Definition 4 (Trigger agent for EFCE). Given a player i ∈ P , a sequence σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi , and a probability
distribution µˆi ∈ ∆Πi(I), an (σ, µˆi)-trigger agent for player i is an agent that takes on the role of player i and
commits to following all recommendations unless she reaches I and gets recommended to play a. If this happens,
the player stops committing to the recommendations and plays according to a plan sampled from µˆi until the game
ends.
It follows that joint probability distribution µ ∈ ∆Π is an EFCE if, for every i ∈ P , player i’s expected utility when
following the recommendations is at least as large as the expected utility that any (σ, µˆi)-trigger agent for player i
can achieve (assuming the opponents’ do not deviate).
Given σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi, in order to express the expected utility of a (σ, µˆi)-trigger agent, it is convenient to
define the probability of the game ending in each terminal node z ∈ Z. Three cases are possible. In the first one,
z ∈ Z(I, a). The probability of reaching z given the joint probability distribution µ ∈ ∆Π and a (σ, µˆi)-trigger
agent is defined as:
pσµ,µˆi(z) :=
 ∑
pii∈Πi(σ)
pi−i∈Π−i(z)
µ(pii, pi−i)

 ∑
pˆii∈Πi(z)
µˆi(pˆii)
 pc(z), (13)
which accounts for the fact that the agent follows recommendations until she receives the recommendation of
playing a at I , and, thus, she ‘gets triggered’ and plays according to pˆii sampled from µˆi from I onwards. The
second case is z ∈ Zc(I, a), which is reached with probability:
yσµ,µˆi(z) :=
 ∑
pii∈Πi(σ)
pi−i∈Π−i(z)
µ(pii, pi−i)

 ∑
pˆii∈Πi(z)
µˆi(pˆii)
 pc(z) +
 ∑
pi∈Π(z)
µ(pi)
 pc(z), (14)
where the first term accounts for the event that z is reached when the agent ‘gets triggered’, while the second term
is the probability of reaching z while not being triggered (notice that the two events are independent). Finally, the
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third case is when z ∈ Z \Z(I) and the infoset I is never reached. Then, the probability of reaching z is defined as:
qµ(z) :=
 ∑
pi∈Π(z)
µ(pi)
 pc(z). (15)
By exploiting the above definitions, the definition of EFCE reads as follows.
Definition 5 (Extensive-form correlated equilibrium). An EFCE of an EFG is a probability distribution µ ∈ ∆Π
such that, for every i ∈ P and (σ, µˆi)-trigger agent for player i, with σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi, it holds:∑
z∈Z
 ∑
pi∈Π(z)
µ(pi)
 pc(z)ui(z) ≥ ∑
z∈Z(I,a)
pσµ,µˆi(z)ui(z) +
∑
z∈Zc(I,a)
yσµ,µˆi(z)ui(z) +
∑
z∈Z\Z(I)
qµ(z)ui(z). (16)
Noticing that the left-hand side of Equation (16) is equal to
∑
z∈Z qµ(z)ui(z) and that y
σ
µ,µˆi
(z) = pσµ,µˆi(z)+qµ(z),
we can rewrite Equation (16) as follows:∑
z∈Z(I,a)
qµ(z)ui(z) ≥
∑
z∈Z(I)
pσµ,µˆi(z)ui(z). (17)
A probability distribution µ ∈ ∆Π is said to be an -EFCE if, for every i ∈ P and (σ, µˆi)-trigger agent for player i,
with σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi, it holds: ∑
z∈Z(I,a)
qµ(z)ui(z) ≥
∑
z∈Z(I)
pσµ,µˆi(z)ui(z)− . (18)
A.2 Computation of EFCEs
The problem of computing an optimal EFCE in extensive-form games with more than two players and/or chance
moves is known to be NP-hard [30]. However, Huang and von Stengel [17] show that the problem of finding one
EFCE can be solved in polynomial time via a variation of the Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm [24, 18]. This
holds for arbitrary EFGs with multiple players and/or chance moves. Unfortunately, that algorithm is mainly a
theoretical tool, and it is known to have limited scalability beyond toy problems. Dudík and Gordon [8] provide
an alternative sampling-based algorithm to compute EFCEs. However, their algorithm is centralized and based
on MCMC sampling which may limit its practical appeal. Our framework is arguably simpler and based on the
classical counterfactual regret minimization algorithm [32, 10]. Moreover, our framework is fully decentralized
since each player, at every decision point, plays so as to minimize her internal/external regret.
If we restrict our attention to two-player perfect-recall games without chance moves, than the problem of deter-
mining an optimal EFCE can be characterized through a succint linear program with polynomial size in the game
description [30]. In this setting, Farina et al. [11] show that the problem of computing an EFCE can be formulated as
the solution to a bilinear saddle-point problem, which they solve via a subgradient descent method. Moreover, Farina
et al. [12] design a regret minimization algorithm suitable for this specific scenario.
B Omitted proofs
B.1 Proofs for Section 4
The following auxiliary result is exploited in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 4. For every iteration t = 1, . . . , T , player i ∈ P , plan pˆii ∈ Πi, joint plan pit = (piti , pit−i) ∈ Π, and
infoset I ∈ Ii, the following holds:
V tI (pˆii)− V tI (piti) =
∑
z∈Z(I)
(
ρ
(pˆii,pi
t
−i)
I→z − ρpi
t
I→z
)
pc(z)ui(z).
Proof. Given an arbitrary infoset I ∈ Ii, the set of terminal nodes immediately reachable from I through action
a ∈ A(I) is defined as
Z I(I, a) := Z(I, a) \
⋃
J∈C(I,a)
Z(J).
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By expanding V tI (pˆii) according to its definition (Equation (8)) and by substituting the definition of immediate
utility vector uti we obtain that
V tI (pˆii) = u
t
i[I, pˆii(I)] +
∑
J∈C(I,pˆii(I))
V tJ (pˆii)
=
∑
z∈Z I(I,pˆii(I))
1[pit−i ∈ Π−i(z)] pc(z)ui(z) +
∑
J∈C(I,pˆii(I))
V tJ (pˆii)
=
∑
z∈Z(I)
ρpˆiiI→z1[pi
t
−i ∈ Π−i(z)] pc(z)ui(z),
where the last expression is obtained by expanding recursively the terms V tJ (pˆii). By definition, ρ
(pˆii,pi
t
−i)
I→z =
ρpˆiiI→z · 1[pit−i ∈ Π−i(z)]. Therefore, we can write V tI (pˆii) =
∑
z∈Z(I) ρ
(pˆii,pi
t
−i)
I→z pc(z)ui(z). Analogously, by
expanding V tI (pi
t
i), we obtain that V
t
I (pi
t
i) =
∑
z∈Z(I) ρ
pit
I→zpc(z)ui(z). This concludes the proof.
Theorem 1. At all times T , the empirical frequency of play µ¯T (Equation 3) is an -EFCE, where
 := max
i∈P
max
σ∈Σi
RTσ
T
.
Proof. Fix any player i ∈ P and any sequence σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi for her. From Lemma 4, the regret RTσ is
RTσ = max
pˆii∈Πi(I)
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]
 ∑
z∈Z(I)
(
ρ
(pˆii,pi
t
−i)
I→z − ρpi
t
I→z
)
pc(z)ui(z)

= max
pˆii∈Πi(I)
T∑
t=1
∑
pi∈Π
1[pi = pit]
1[pii ∈ Πi(σ)]
 ∑
z∈Z(I)
(
ρ
(pˆii,pi−i)
I→z − ρpiI→z
)
pc(z)ui(z)

= max
pˆii∈Πi(I)
∑
pi∈Π
1[pii ∈ Πi(σ)]
( T∑
t=1
1[pi = pit]
) ∑
z∈Z(I)
(
ρ
(pˆii,pi−i)
I→z − ρpiI→z
)
pc(z)ui(z)
.
By using the definition of empirical frequency of play, we can write
∑T
t=1 1[pi = pi
t] = T µ¯T (pi). Hence,
RTσ = T max
pˆii∈Πi(I)
∑
pi∈Π
1[pii ∈ Πi(σ)]
µ¯T (pi)
 ∑
z∈Z(I)
(
ρ
(pˆii,pi−i)
I→z − ρpiI→z
)
pc(z)ui(z)

= T max
pˆii∈Πi(I)
∑
pii∈Πi(σ)
pi−i∈Π−i
µ¯T (pi)
 ∑
z∈Z(I)
(
ρ
(pˆii,pi−i)
I→z − ρpiI→z
)
pc(z)ui(z)

= T max
pˆii∈Πi(I)
∑
z∈Z(I)
∑
pii∈Πi(σ)
pi−i∈Π−i
µ¯T (pi)
(
ρ
(pˆii,pi−i)
I→z − ρpiI→z
)
pc(z)ui(z).
Using the definition of the ρI→z symbols, that is,
ρ
(pˆii,pi−i)
I→z = ρ
pˆii
I→z · 1[pi−i ∈ Π−i(z)], ρpiI→z = ρpiiI→z · 1[pi−i ∈ Π−i(z)],
we further obtain
RTσ = T max
pˆii∈Πi(I)
∑
z∈Z(I)
∑
pii∈Πi(σ)
pi−i∈Π−i
µ¯T (pi)
(
ρpˆiiI→z − ρpiiI→z
)
1[pi−i ∈ Π−i(z)]pc(z)ui(z)
= T max
pˆii∈Πi(I)
∑
z∈Z(I)
∑
pii∈Πi(σ)
pi−i∈Π−i(z)
µ¯T (pi)
(
ρpˆiiI→z − ρpiiI→z
)
pc(z)ui(z)
13
= T
 maxpˆii∈Πi(I) ∑
z∈Z(I)
∑
pii∈Πi(σ)
pi−i∈Π−i(z)
µ¯T (pi)ρpˆiiI→z pc(z)ui(z)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
− T
 ∑
z∈Z(I)
∑
pii∈Πi(σ)
pi−i∈Π−i(z)
µ¯T (pi)ρpiiI→z pc(z)ui(z)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
.
We now analyze B and C separately.
B By convexity, we have:
B = max
µˆi∈∆Πi(I)

∑
pˆii∈Πi(I)
µˆi(pˆii)
 ∑
z∈Z(I)
∑
pii∈Πi(σ)
pi−i∈Π−i(z)
µ¯T (pi)ρpˆiiI→z pc(z)ui(z)


= max
µˆi∈∆Πi(I)

∑
z∈Z(I)
 ∑
pˆii∈Πi(I)
µˆi(pˆii)ρ
pˆii
I→z

 ∑
pii∈Πi(σ)
pi−i∈Π−i(z)
µ¯T (pi)pc(z)ui(z)

.
Since pˆii ∈ Πi(I) and z ∈ Z(I), ρpˆiiI→z = 1[pˆii ∈ Πi(z)]. So,
B = max
µˆi∈∆Πi(I)

∑
z∈Z(I)
 ∑
pˆii∈Πi(I)
µˆi(pˆii)1[pˆii ∈ Πi(z)]

 ∑
pii∈Πi(σ)
pi−i∈Π−i(z)
µ¯T (pi)pc(z)ui(z)


= max
µˆi∈∆Πi(I)

∑
z∈Z(I)
 ∑
pˆii∈Πi(z)
µˆi(pˆii)

 ∑
pii∈Πi(σ)
pi−i∈Π−i(z)
µ¯T (pi)
pc(z)ui(z)

= max
µˆi∈∆Πi(I)
 ∑
z∈Z(I)
pσµ¯T, µˆi(z)ui(z)
. (19)
C Since pii ∈ Πi(σ) ⊆ Πi(I) and z ∈ Z(I), ρpiiI→z = 1[z ∈ Z(σ)] · 1[pii ∈ Πi(z)]. Therefore,
C =
∑
z∈Z(I)
∑
pii∈Πi(σ)
pi−i∈Π−i(z)
µ¯T (pi)1[z ∈ Z(σ)]1[pii ∈ Πi(z)] pc(z)ui(z)
=
∑
z∈Z(I)
1[z ∈ Z(σ)] ∑
pii∈Πi(σ)
pi−i∈Π−i(z)
µ¯T (pi)1[pii ∈ Πi(z)] pc(z)ui(z)

=
∑
z∈Z(σ)
 ∑
pii∈Πi(z)
pi−i∈Π−i(z)
µ¯T (pi)
pc(z)ui(z)
=
∑
z∈Z(σ)
qµ¯T (z)ui(z). (20)
Substituting the expressions in (19) and (20) into the expression for RTσ , we obtain
RTσ
T
= max
µˆi∈∆Πi(I)
 ∑
z∈Z(I)
pσµ¯T, µˆi(z)ui(z)
− ∑
z∈Z(σ)
qµ¯T (z)ui(z). (21)
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Finally, using the hypothesis, we can write
 = max
i∈P
max
σ∈Σi
RTσ
T
= max
i∈P
max
σ∈Σi
 maxµˆi∈∆Πi(I)
 ∑
z∈Z(I)
pσµ¯T, µˆi(z)ui(z)
− ∑
z∈Z(σ)
qµ¯T (z)ui(z)

= δ(µ¯T ).
This concludes the proof.
Corollary 1. If lim sup
T→∞
max
i∈P
max
σ∈Σi
RTσ
T
≤ 0, then lim sup
T→∞
δ(µ¯T ) ≤ 0, that is, for any  > 0, eventually the empirical
frequency of play µ¯T becomes an -EFCE.
Proof. By Equation (21) we obtain:
0 = lim sup
T→∞
RTσ
T
= lim sup
T→∞
 max
µˆi∈∆Πi(I)
 ∑
z∈Z(I)
pσµ¯T, µˆi(z)ui(z)
− ∑
z∈Z(σ)
qµ¯T (z)ui(z)

≥ max
µˆi∈∆Πi(I)
lim supT→∞ ∑
z∈Z(I)
pσµ¯T, µˆi(z)ui(z)
− lim supT→∞ ∑
z∈Z(σ)
qµ¯T (z)ui(z),
where the last inequality follows from swapping the order of lim sup and max. By definition of lim sup, for any
 > 0, eventually δ(µ¯T ) < 0 (more precisely: for any  > 0, there must be a τ = τ() such that δ(µ¯T ) <  for all
T ≥ τ ), which means that eventually the empirical frequency of play µ¯T becomes an -EFCE.
B.2 Proof for Section 5
Lemma 1. The subtree regret for each player i ∈ P , sequence σ = (J, a′) ∈ Σi, and infoset I ∈ C?(J) can be
decomposed as:
RTσ,I = max
a∈A(I)

T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]
(
uˆtI(a)− uˆtI(piti(I))
)
+
∑
I′∈C(I,a)
RTσ,I′
.
Proof. By using the recursive definitions of RTσ,I and V
t
I (pˆii), we get:
RTσ,I = max
pˆii∈Πi(I)
{
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]
(
V tI (pˆii)− V tI (piti)
)}
= max
pˆii∈Πi(I)
{
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]V tI (pˆii)
}
−
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]V tI (piti)
= max
pˆii∈Πi(I)

T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]
uti[I, pˆii(I)] + ∑
I′∈C(I,pˆii(I))
V tI′(pˆii)

−
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]V tI (piti)
= max
a∈A(I)

T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]uti[I, a] +
∑
I′∈C(I,a)
max
pˆii∈Πi(I′)
{
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]V tI′(pˆii)
}
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−
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]V tI (piti)
= max
a∈A(I)

T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]uti[I, a] +
∑
I′∈C(I,a)
(
RTσ,I′ +
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]V tI′(piti)
)
−
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]V tI (piti),
where the last step is by definition of subtree regret. By rewriting the above expression according to Equation (9)
we get the result.
Lemma 2. For every player i ∈ P , sequence σ = (J, a′) ∈ Σi, and infoset I ∈ C?(J), it holds:
RTσ,I ≤ max
pˆii∈Πi(I)
∑
I′∈Ii
1[pˆii ∈ Πi(I ′)] RˆTσ,I′ . (12)
Proof. Consider an arbitrary sequence σ = (J, a′) ∈ Σi and infoset I ∈ C?(J). By Lemma 1 we have:
RTσ,I = max
a∈A(I)

T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]
(
uˆtI(a)− uˆtI(piti(I))
)
+
∑
I′∈C(I,a)
RTσ,I′

= max
a∈A(I)

T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]uˆtI(a) +
∑
I′∈C(I,a)
RTσ,I′
−
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]uˆtI(piti(I))
≤ max
a∈A(I)
{
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]uˆtI(a)
}
+ max
a∈A(I)
 ∑
I′∈C(I,a)
RTσ,I′
−
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ)]uˆtI(piti(I))
= RˆTσ,I + max
a∈A(I)
 ∑
I′∈C(I,a)
RTσ,I′
.
By starting from I and applying the above equation inductively, we obtain the result.
B.3 Proofs for Section 6
Lemma 5. For any I ∈ Ii and t = 1, . . . , T , if it is the case that piti /∈ Πi(I), then the sequence σtI defined by
SAMPLEINTERNAL exists and is unique.
Proof. It is enough to proceed from infoset I towards the root of the tree. Eventually, the procedure reaches an
infoset I ′ ∈ Ii such that piti ∈ Πi(I ′). Then, σtI is identified by the pair (I ′, piti(I ′)).
Lemma 3. For any I, J ∈ Ii : I  J , if RˆTσ,J = o(T ) for all σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi then RˆTσ(I),J = o(T ).
Proof. By hypothesis and since the action space A(I) is finite we have that∑
a∈A(I)
RˆT(I,a),J = o(T ).
Moreover, ∑
a∈A(I)
RˆT(I,a),J =
∑
a∈A(I)
max
aˆ∈A(J)
{
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(I, a)]
(
uˆtJ(aˆ)− uˆtJ(piti(J))
)}
≥ max
aˆ∈A(J)

T∑
t=1
∑
a∈A(I)
1[piti ∈ Πi(I, a)]
(
uˆtJ(aˆ)− uˆtJ(piti(J))
)
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= max
aˆ∈A(J)
{
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(I)]
(
uˆtJ(aˆ)− uˆtJ(piti(J))
)}
= max
aˆ∈A(J)
{
T∑
t=1
1[piti ∈ Πi(σ(I))]
(
uˆtJ(aˆ)− uˆtJ(piti(J))
)}
= RˆTσ(I),J .
This concludes the proof.
Theorem 2. When all the players play according to ICFR, µ¯T converges almost surely to an EFCE.
Proof. By Theorem 1, in order to converge to an EFCE, it is enough to minimize the trigger regrets RTσ for each
player i ∈ P and sequence σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi. This can be done by minimizing the subtree regrets RTσ,I via the
minimization of laminar subtree regrets RˆTσ,I for each sequence σ = (J, a) ∈ Σi and infoset I ∈ C?(J) (Lemma 2).
For any infoset I ∈ Ii, the laminar subtree regrets RˆTσ,I are partitioned in three groups on the basis of the trigger
sequence σ:
• Group 1: σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi. Laminar subtree regrets belonging to this group are updated at rounds t such
that piti ∈ Πi(I), otherwise they remain unchanged. Therefore, they are only updated when the strategy at
I is recommended by the internal-regret minimizerRINTI , which guarantees RˆTσ,I = o(T ) [5].
• Group 2: σ = (J, a) ∈ Σi, J  I and a is not on the path from J to I (i.e., for any pii ∈ Πi, pii(J) = a
implies pii /∈ Πi(I)). The sequence σtI is defined as a sequence compatible with piti and belonging to
Σci (I). By Lemma 5, for each I ∈ Ii and t = 1, . . . , T , σtI exists and is unique. Then, at most one laminar
subtree regret term of Group 2 is updated at each round t, otherwise they are left unchanged. Whenever
one of these regrets is affected by the choice at t, the action at I is selected according to the external-regret
minimizer REXTσtI ,I . This ensures that each laminar subtree regret belonging to this group is o(T ) by the
known properties of no-external-regret algorithms [5].
• Group 3: σ = (J, a) is such that J  I , J 6= I , and a is on the path from J to I (notice that for each
J  I one such a is unique because player i has perfect recall). Let K ∈ Ii, J  K  I and K ∈ C(J, a)
(given I , J , and σ one such K is unique because of the perfect recall assumption). By Lemma 3, we know
that if RˆTσ′,I = o(T ) for all σ
′ = (K, a′) ∈ Σi, then RˆTσ,I = o(T ). By applying the lemma recursively,
until all σ′ belong to either Group 1 or 2, we can guarantee that RˆTσ,I = o(T ).
This concludes the proof.
C Experimental Evaluation
Appendix C.1 provides a detailed description of the benchmark games used in our experiments. Finally, Ap-
pendix C.2 shows additional experimental results for ICFR.
C.1 Benchmark games
The size (in terms on number of infosets and sequences) of the parametric instances we use as benchmark is
described in Figure 4. In the following, we provide a detailed explanation of the rules of the games.
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|P| Ranks Player Infosets Sequences
Kuhn
3 3
Player 1 12 25
Player 2 12 25
Player 3 12 25
3 4
Player 1 16 33
Player 2 16 33
Player 3 16 33
Goofspiel
2 3 Player 1 213 262Player 2 213 262
2 4 Player 1 8716 10649Player 2 8716 10649
3 3
Player 1 837 934
Player 2 837 934
Player 3 837 934
Leduc 3 3
Player 1 3294 7687
Player 2 3294 7687
Player 2 3294 7687
Grid Rounds Player Infosets Sequences
Battleship (2, 2) 3 Player 1 1413 2965Player 2 1873 4101
Figure 4: The size of our parametric game instances in terms of number of sequences and infosets for each player of the game.
Kuhn poker The two-player version of the game was originally proposed by [20], while the three-player variation
is due to [9]. In a three-player Kuhn poker game with rank r, there are r possible cards. Each player initially pays
one chip to the pot, and she/he is dealt a single private card. The first player may check or bet (i.e., put an additional
chip in the pot). Then, the second player can check or bet after a first player’s check, or fold/call the first player’s
bet. If no bet was previously made, the third player can either check or bet. Otherwise, she/he has to fold or call.
After a bet of the second player (resp., third player), the first player (resp., the first and the second players) still has
to decide whether to fold or to call the bet. At the showdown, the player with the highest card who has not folded
wins all the chips in the pot.
Goofspiel This game was originally introduced by [25]. Goofspiel is essentially a bidding game where each
player has a hand of cards numbered from 1 to r (i.e., the rank of the game). A third stack of r cards is shuffled and
singled out as prizes. Each turn, a prize card is revealed, and each player privately chooses one of her/his cards to
bid, with the highest card winning the current prize. In case of a tie, the prize card is discarded. After r turns, all the
prizes have been dealt out and the payoff of each player is computed as follows: each prize card’s value is equal to
its face value and the players’ scores are computed as the sum of the values of the prize cards they have won. We
remark that due to the tie-breaking rule that we employ, even two-player instances of the game are general-sum. All
the Goofspiel instances have limited information, i.e., actions of the other players are observed only at the end of
the game. This makes the game strategically more challenging, as players have less information regarding previous
opponents’ actions.
Leduc We use a three-player version of the classical Leduc hold’em poker introduced by Southey et al. [28]. In a
Leduc game instance with r ranks the deck consists of three suits with r cards each. As the game starts players pay
one chip to the pot. There are two betting rounds. In the first one a single private card is dealt to each player while
in the second round a single board card is revealed. The maximum number of raise per round is set to two, with
raise amounts of 2 and 4 in the first and second round, respectively.
Battleship is a parametric version of the classic board game, where two competing fleets take turns at shooting at
each other. For a detailed explanation of the Battleship game see the work by [11] that introduced it. Our instance
has loss multiplier equal to 2, and one ship of length 2 and value 1 for each player
C.2 Additional results
We provide detailed results on the convergence of ICFR in terms of players’ incentives to deviate from the obtained
empirical frequency of play µ¯T . For EFCEs, these incentives correspond to the maximum deviation of each player,
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as defined in the outer maximization in Equation (7). Intuitively, for each player, this represents the maximum
utility any trigger agent for that player could gain by deviating from the point in which it gets triggered onwards.
We do not only consider deviations as prescribed by EFCE, but we also show results for other solutions concepts
involving correlation in EFGs, namely EFCCEs and NFCCEs (see Appendix A for their informal description, while
for their formal definitions the reader can refer to Farina et al. [13]). As for EFCCEs, the players’ incentives to
deviate are defined in a way similar to EFCE, using the definition of trigger agent suitable for EFCCEs (see [13]).
Instead, for NFCCEs, each player’s incentive to deviate corresponds to the utility she/he could gain by playing the
best normal-form plan given µ¯T . We recall that the following relation holds: EFCE ⊆ EFCCE ⊆ NFCCE.
In Figures 5 - 11, we report players’ incentives to deviate obtained with ICFR for EFCE (Left), EFCCE (Center),
and NFCCE (Right). As the plots show, the convergence rate is similar for the three cases, electing ICFR as an
appealing algorithm also for EFCCEs and NFCCEs. This is the first example of algorithm computing -EFCCEs
efficiently in general-sum EFGs with more than two players and chance. Celli et al. [4] propose some algorithms to
compute -NFCCEs in general-sum EFGs with an arbitrary number of players (including chance). Our algorithm
outperforms those of Celli et al. [4], since the latter cannot reach a 0.1-NFCCE in less than 24h on a Leduc instance
with 1200 total infosets and a one-bet maximum per bidding round. Instead, ICFR reaches  = 0.1 in around 9h on
an arguably more complex Leduc instance (i.e., more than 9k total infosets and a two-bet maximum per round).
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Figure 5: Players’ incentives to deviate with ICFR in the Battleship game.
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Figure 6: Players’ incentives to deviate with ICFR in two-player Goofspiel with 3 ranks.
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Figure 7: Players’ incentives to deviate with ICFR in two-player Goofspiel with 4 ranks.
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Figure 8: Players’ incentives to deviate with ICFR in three-player Goofspiel with 3 ranks.
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Figure 9: Players’ incentives to deviate with ICFR in three-player Kuhn Poker with 3 ranks.
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Figure 10: Players’ incentives to deviate with ICFR in three-player Kuhn Poker with 4 ranks.
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Figure 11: Players’ incentives to deviate with ICFR in three-player Leduc Poker with 3 ranks.
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